CO129-382 - Public Offices - 1911 — Page 290

(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.}

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strict orders to induce suppression of disorder, and to treat those who disregard counsel and banded themselves into law-resisting mobs by prompt arrest and sev punishment.

Now the Ministers of the Grand Council have also presented a memorial on i aspect of affairs. This, too, is improper.

The reduction of the period for the inauguration of Parliament to the 5th year Hsuan Tung was fixed by our decree in answer to the request, after collecti discussion, of the Ministers of the Court. At that time we stated clearly that aft that notification any further proposal for relaxation of the period was absoluts impossible. It is precisely the multiplicity of affairs and the nearness of the dr which makes pushing on all branches of the work of preparation essential, and rende impossible the avoidance of difficulties of every type. The Viceroys and governors the various provinces, in their reports and memorials, have likewise for the most pa realised this. Yet ignorant and irresponsible persons, not appreciating this point view, still give vent to their demands, and constantly collect together in large gan and intimidate the authorities.

At present, too, under the title of the representatives of Manchuria, such perso have come to Peking and caused repeated worry and trouble by handing in plaint such a proceeding is a gross breach of propriety.

We command the Board of the Interior and the office of the commandant gendarmerie forthwith to depute officials to convey men of this class immediately! their native places, to carry on peaceably each his own calling; they must be forbidd to loiter in Peking.

The Throne has repeatedly displayed most generous leniency towards ignora and stupid folk who, in stress of hard times, give utterance to wild statements; y spite of this, subjects of the State though they are, they actually defy right and lat There is grave fear that evil persons are secretly endeavouring by trumped-up pretex to inflame men's minds, with the hope of causing a disturbance of the public peace. Unless at the very outset precautions are taken thoroughly to suppress troubl and inflict penalties, the result must inevitably be an outbreak of rebellion.

Hereafter, should there be a continuance of persons coming to Peking an trumping up pleas to create trouble, the Board of the Interior and the office of th commandant of gendarmerie will assuredly be held responsible.

In the provinces, should further cases of riotous assemblings take place, the very fact will prove the participants to be lawless and dishonest folk. The Vicero and governors are, each and all, invested with the responsibility for the territor under their several jurisdiction. We command that they shall forthwith yield implic obedience to our Imperial decree of the 4th November, make prompt arrests, and inflic severe punishments. There must not be the slightest display of toleration. Our ain is to secure that the people may live in peace, and to guard against secret sources disaster.

[B]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[2212]

No. 1.

C O 3447

[January 19.]

of 3 FEB 11

SECTION 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received January 19.)

(No. 2. Confidential.) Sir,

Peking, January 2, 1911. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 340 of the 27th September last, enclosing copies of correspondence between yourself and His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington in regard to the irritation felt in certain circles in America at the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government towards American proposals for the construction of railways in Manchuria, and inviting me to offer suggestions as to what action could properly be taken to soothe in some degree this feeling of irritation.

The soreness which apparently exists at Washington on the subject of British policy in China dates from June 1909, when the Americans intervened in the Hukuang Railway question. Mr. Rockhill, the American Minister, who had no sympathy with the new departure in American policy in China, was transferred to St. Petersburgh, and the direction of the legation was placed in the hands of Mr. Fletcher, who warmly espoused the cause of the American financiers and greatly underestimated the difficulties which the enforcement of the new policy necessarily involved.

Mr. Straight, a comparatively young man, who had risen with unexampled rapidity from a subordinate position in the Chinese Customs service to the post of United States consul-general at Mukden, came here to represent the American group of financiers, and both he and Mr. Fletcher were impatient at the delay in the negotiations which prevented them from realising the extravagant expectations with which the scheme of industrial exploitation of China had been launched. The correspondents of the "New York Herald" and of other American newspapers were not slow to attribute the failure of American plans to the attitude of the British group of financiers, and for a time the relations of the two groups were somewhat strained. All this has now passed away, and a feeling of mutual confidence has happily taken its place.

As regards the more immediate subject of American irritation--our attitude towards the Chinchow-Aigun Railway project-a reconciliation of views is, I fear, far more difficult. The project is essentially a political one rather than an economic one, It originated with Tong Shoa-yi, when Governor of Mukden, and was avowedly an attempt to enlist American and British support as a means of counteracting the growing influence of Japan in Manchuria. It aroused much enthusiasm amongst a considerable number of Chinese officials in Peking who had received their education in America, and great disappointment was felt that the British Government did not see its way to join the Americans in championing what were considered the rights of China. Our reluctance to do more than play the part of benevolent spectators was freely ascribed by American newspaper correspondents to our alliance with Japan, which obliged us to sacrifice our commercial interests to considerations of political friendship. Japan, it is generally considered, is following the procedure in Manchuria which led to the annexation of Corea, and it is thought strange that we should view with indifference the prospect of one of the richest regions in Asia being eventually closed against our trade by a highly protective tariff.

Assuming even that Japan is bent upon the absorption of Manchuria, I do not myself see that any measures which we or the United States are likely to take will seriously affect the result. The future of Manchuria will probably depend more upon China herself, and the ability of her people to meet Japanese economic competition than upon any outside support which even the United States will feel justified in offering.

So far, therefore, as Manchuria is concerned, I am afraid we cannot do much, having regard to our obligations to Japan, to soothe American susceptibilities. If the Americans would accept any of the various compromises that have at different

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